Nepali IDEA

A Geopolitical and Strategic Reassessment

Introduction: Democracy Under Fire

The decision—or even the mere discussion—of holding national elections during active armed conflict represents one of the most profound tests of democratic resilience. Two contemporary cases, Ukraine and Israel, offer contrasting yet equally instructive paradigms. In Ukraine, the very idea of a wartime poll is fraught with existential danger; in Israel, it is a constitutional routine that may reshuffle leadership without altering strategic fundamentals. Both, however, show that wartime elections are never merely domestic affairs—they are geostrategic events with ripple effects across continents.

Ukraine: Internal Division as a Strategic Vulnerability

The Origins of the Debate

The public call for a wartime presidential election in Ukraine, most notably amplified by former Defense Minister Oleksii Fedorov, has ignited a fierce constitutional and political controversy. The debate has intensified as opposition voices see a window of opportunity, while President Zelenskyy’s allies may be using the issue for political positioning.

Legal and Constitutional Prohibitions

Ukraine has been under martial law since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Under Article 19 of the martial law legislation, holding national elections or referendums is explicitly prohibited.

Constitutional Arguments: While the Ukrainian Constitution does not directly prohibit elections during war, the law on martial law does. President Zelenskyy’s mandate formally expired in May 2024, but Ukrainian authorities maintain that elections cannot be held while martial law is in effect, and the president must continue in office until constitutional succession is possible. Russia has exploited this argument to question Zelenskyy’s legitimacy, claiming he lacks authority to sign peace agreements.

Legislative Changes Needed: To hold a wartime vote, Ukraine would need to either amend the martial law legislation, seek a Supreme Court ruling, or suspend martial law entirely—which Parliament has the power to do. Political analysts estimate it would take at least six months to draft and pass a new legislative framework governing wartime elections.

Logistical Impossibility: A State Divided by War

Holding a credible election under current conditions faces severe practical obstacles:

-Refugees Abroad: Over 4.4 million Ukrainian refugees have temporary protection status in EU countries alone. Ukraine’s foreign consulates lack the physical capacity to securely process millions of votes.

– Internally Displaced: Nearly 4 million Ukrainians are displaced internally, making voter registration and polling location management extraordinarily complex.

– Occupied Territories: Approximately 19% of Ukrainian territory remains under Russian control, with roughly 4.5 million adult citizens living behind enemy lines who would be entirely cut off from participation, severely undermining the election’s national legitimacy.

– Military Voters: Around 1 million Ukrainians serve in the defense forces. Allowing soldiers in active trenches or on drone-infested frontlines to safely and privately cast ballots presents an unprecedented logistical nightmare.

– Energy Infrastructure Vulnerability: Ongoing Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector have left the grid highly unstable, which would severely disrupt electronic voting systems and counting centers.

Security Risks

Mass gatherings at polling stations would present prime targets for Russian drones and missiles. Zelenskyy has stated he would be prepared to hold elections only if the United States and European allies could provide sufficient security guarantees. Political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko notes that even a ceasefire on air strikes would be a fundamental first step.

Political Fragility: A Gift to Moscow

Beyond logistics, the political consequences are potentially catastrophic:

– Legitimacy Crisis: A rushed, partial, or chaotic vote would likely be weaponized by Russian disinformation networks, with Moscow seeking to label the results a sham to damage Ukraine’s international standing and domestic morale.

– Divisive Campaigning: A democratic election requires intense political campaigning, debate, and criticism of the current administration. Many Ukrainians fear this would break the national unity required to survive the war.

– Constitutional Concerns: Scholar Oleksandr Vodiannikov has argued that wartime parliamentary elections are expressis verbis inconsistent with the Ukrainian Constitution and would undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions, potentially leading to democratic backsliding.

 Strategic Outcome: Weakening Kyiv’s Hand

– Financial Cost: Running a national election is estimated to cost upwards of $220 million, with critics arguing these funds and administrative focus would be better directed toward military defense and civilian survival.

– Public Opinion: Polls show that a majority of the Ukrainian public opposes holding elections until the war is won, viewing the practical obstacles as insurmountable for a truly free and fair vote.

Israel: Policy Continuity Amid Leadership Uncertainty

A Different Constitutional Framework

Unlike Ukraine, Israel operates under a parliamentary system with no explicit prohibition on wartime elections. The October 27 vote comes after months of political paralysis and in the shadow of a multi-front war—against Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and directly with Iran via missile exchanges and covert operations.

Strategic Doctrine Above Partisanship

The most striking feature of Israeli politics in this context is the bipartisan consensus on core security issues:

– Iranian Nuclear Program: All major parties agree that a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat and that Israel reserves the right to unilateral military action.

– Security Continuity: Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu loses, Israel’s core strategic direction—particularly its hardline stance against Iran and its overarching national security doctrine—is unlikely to shift dramatically.

Netanyahu’s Political Survival

Where the election does matter is in personnel and execution:

– Public Anger: The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, which resulted in over 1,100 Israeli deaths and 250 hostages, was the single most traumatic security failure in the nation’s history. Netanyahu’s personal approval ratings have plummeted.

– Succession Possibilities: Polls point to growth of candidates like Gadi Eisenkot, backed by centrist and center-right figures such as Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman. This suggests a significant portion of the electorate seeks to renew leadership without modifying the fundamental principles of Israeli security policy

– Potential Coalition Dynamics: A coalition with Bennett and Lieberman would combine security legitimacy, administrative experience, and ability to negotiate parliamentary agreements, potentially reducing the governmental influence of more ideological sectors.

International Relations

The external dimension adds another layer of complexity:

– U.S.-Israel Relations: While analysts anticipate continuity in overall U.S.-Israel ties, the election outcome could affect the pace and tone of engagement on issues like Iran.

– Regional Dynamics: Turkey has accused Netanyahu of using regional tensions to legitimize policies ahead of the elections, with Ankara stating that Netanyahu’s aggressive and coercive policies stem from his intention to continue expansionist actions before the October 27 vote.

– Gulf Normalization: The Abraham Accords were a Netanyahu-era achievement. A new government may accelerate or decelerate normalization with Saudi Arabia depending on its stance on various regional issues.

Comparative Synthesis: Two Wars, Two Logics

Dimension	Ukraine	Israel
Constitutional Feasibility	Prohibited under martial law	Permitted and practiced
Logistical Challenge	Nearly insurmountable (4.4M refugees, 4 M displaced, 19% occupied)	Manageable within secure areas
Strategic Risk	Fragmentation, loss of unity	Minimal; policy continuity expected
Geopolitical Beneficiary	Russia gains leverage	No external power gains decisively
Leadership Change Impact	Potentially catastrophic for war effort	Managerial, not directional

Broader Geopolitical Observations

Beyond the two case studies, these elections reveal broader trends in contemporary international relations:

1. Democracy as a Battlefield: In both cases, the electoral process itself has become a weapon of war. Russia seeks to delegitimize Ukrainian democracy; Iran and its proxies monitor Israeli political shifts for tactical openings.

2. Public Opinion and War Fatigue: Both countries are experiencing varying degrees of war fatigue. In Ukraine, it manifests as pressure for a political settlement; in Israel, as anger toward leadership failures.

3. The Limits of Western Influence: Despite significant military and diplomatic support from the United States and Europe, neither Kyiv nor Tel Aviv conducts its electoral calendar according to Western preferences.

Conclusion: Elections as Geopolitical Signals

Wartime elections are never neutral. They send powerful signals to allies, adversaries, and domestic populations. In Ukraine, holding an election would be an act of self-harm, playing directly into Russian narratives and logistical realities. In Israel, the election is a routine democratic exercise that may change the face of leadership but not the contours of national security policy.

What unites both cases is this: the electoral process has become an integral part of the geopolitical battlefield. How each country navigates this test will shape not only its own future but also the broader security architecture of Europe and the Middle East.

 References

1. Camponovo, C. (2026, August 19). L’Ucraina fra la guerra e il nodo delle urne. RSI Radiotelevisione svizzera.

2. Ukraine to Hold Elections While at War? The Obstacles and Risks Explained. (2026, August 18). News18.

3. Puede Ucrania celebrar elecciones en plena guerra, como exige el exministro de Defensa? (2026, August 18). France 24.

4. Israel entre la continuidad y el cambio. (2026, July 16). Radio Sefarad.

5. Netanyahu: We will not tolerate any Turkish military presence in Syria that threatens Israel. (2026, August 18). Agenzia Nova.

6. Vodiannikov, O. (2023). Wartime Elections as Democratic Backsliding. Verfassungsblog.

7. Tác động qua lại giữa xung đột tại Ukraine và Gaza với cuộc bầu cử Mỹ. (2024, September 16). VOV.

This analysis is based on open-source intelligence, constitutional provisions, and strategic assessments current as of the date of publication. The views expressed are for academic discourse and food for thought.

Part I: Background

24 July 2026, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) jointly issued a public statement expressing concern over what they described as credible reports that the three most senior Justices of the Supreme Court of Nepal—Justice Sapana Pradhan Malla, Justice Kumar Regmi, and Justice Hari Prasad Phuyal—had allegedly been pressured to resign or face impeachment. The organizations urged the Government of Nepal to refrain from any such action, arguing that recent governmental conduct appeared to substantiate these concerns. Their statement also referred to issues including the alleged disregard of judicial seniority in the appointment of the Chief Justice and the promulgation of an Ordinance concerning the Constitutional Council.

These developments raise important constitutional questions that extend beyond the immediate controversy. On the one hand, they concern the appropriate role of international human rights organizations in safeguarding judicial independence. On the other, they invite reflection on the constitutional limits of external engagement with Nepal’s sovereign institutions, including Parliament’s legislative authority and the constitutional autonomy of the State. Determining the proper balance between these competing considerations has become a matter of considerable constitutional significance.

Against this backdrop, the House of Representatives Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights convened deliberations on the matter. Having been invited to participate in those discussions as an expert, I consider it appropriate to present my views in the form of this article.

It is beyond dispute that international human rights organizations have made significant contributions to Nepal’s democratic movement and to the protection of human rights throughout the country’s modern political history. Their advocacy during periods of political transition and armed conflict deserves due recognition and appreciation. Nevertheless, it must also be acknowledged that not all of their reports and public statements have been equally well-founded. On certain occasions, some assessments have rested on questionable factual premises or have contributed to public misunderstanding of complex constitutional and political realities.

For example, while these organizations played an important role in documenting human rights violations during Nepal’s armed conflict, some of their later interventions have generated legitimate controversy. Public statements that appeared to misrepresent historical or political realities, or that opposed legislation on transitional justice adopted through broad national political consensus, illustrate that international organizations are not immune from factual or analytical error. Recognition of their valuable contributions should therefore not preclude critical scrutiny of the accuracy and evidentiary basis of their public interventions.

The current controversy must therefore be understood within this broader historical and constitutional context. The decision of the parliamentary committee to examine the matter is both timely and institutionally appropriate. As Nepal continues to consolidate its democratic constitutional order, questions concerning the relationship between judicial independence, the protection of human rights, and national sovereignty inevitably arise. Allegations that the Executive has sought to exert improper influence over the Judiciary, public statements issued by international human rights organizations concerning such allegations, and the corresponding response of the State together present issues of exceptional constitutional sensitivity. Such matters should not be approached through political rhetoric or emotional reaction; rather, they require careful analysis grounded in constitutional law, legal principle, and internationally accepted standards.

The Constitution of Nepal envisions the Judiciary as an independent, impartial, and competent institution of the State. Judicial independence, together with the separation of powers and the rule of law, constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of democratic constitutional governance. Accordingly, where credible allegations arise that judges have been subjected to improper pressure, intimidation, or influence by the Executive, those allegations must be investigated through an independent, impartial, and credible process. Judicial independence is not merely a privilege enjoyed by judges; rather, it is the institutional guarantee through which every citizen’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial hearing is protected.

Equally important, however, is the principle that serious allegations should not be advanced publicly without adequate factual support, reliable evidence, and impartial investigation. Unsubstantiated accusations have the potential to undermine public confidence in the Judiciary, and public trust remains one of the essential foundations upon which democratic constitutional government rests. Freedom to make allegations must therefore be accompanied by the responsibility to substantiate them. Under the rule of law, allegations do not constitute legal truth; rather, truth emerges through due process, objective investigation, and evidentiary assessment.

International law similarly recognizes the necessity of maintaining this constitutional balance. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary require that judges be protected from external pressure, intimidation, interference, and improper influence. Likewise, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct identify judicial independence, impartiality, integrity, and institutional credibility as indispensable foundations of democratic governance. Furthermore, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees every individual the right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. These international instruments collectively demonstrate that judicial independence is not merely a domestic constitutional principle but a universally recognized requirement of the rule of law.

Part II: International Human Rights Organizations, National Sovereignty, and Comparative Constitutional Practice

International human rights organizations play an indispensable role within democratic societies. Their principal functions include monitoring alleged human rights violations, documenting and disseminating factual information, drawing governmental attention to matters of concern, and advocating on behalf of victims whose rights may have been infringed. In many parts of the world, such organizations have significantly contributed to strengthening democratic accountability, promoting transparency, and encouraging governments to comply with their international human rights obligations. Their work has frequently served as an important safeguard against the abuse of state power and has provided an independent voice where domestic accountability mechanisms have proven inadequate.

However, the legitimacy and credibility of these organizations are themselves founded upon universally accepted principles of fairness and objectivity. Their conclusions should be based upon verifiable facts, credible evidence, impartial investigation, and procedures that provide all relevant parties with a reasonable opportunity to present their respective positions. Institutional credibility is not derived from reputation alone, nor from prior contributions to the advancement of human rights. Rather, it is sustained through rigorous adherence to professional standards of fact-finding, methodological transparency, procedural fairness, and evidence-based reasoning. The moral authority of international human rights organizations ultimately depends upon their continuing commitment to these principles.

The present debate also raises an equally significant constitutional issue: the scope and meaning of Nepal’s national sovereignty. Under the Constitution of Nepal, sovereignty is vested in the Nepali people and exercised through the constitutional institutions established by the Constitution. International organizations, including international non-governmental organizations, undoubtedly possess the right to express concern, offer recommendations, and critically evaluate governmental conduct. Nevertheless, they do not possess constitutional authority to exercise the powers vested in Nepal’s constitutional organs or to substitute their own judgment for decisions that belong, under the Constitution, to Nepal’s democratic institutions. Consequently, neither unconditional acceptance nor automatic rejection of international criticism represents a constitutionally appropriate response. Rather, such interventions should be evaluated objectively based on evidence, constitutional principles, and due legal process.

Comparative constitutional experience demonstrates that democratic states have frequently confronted similar tensions between judicial independence, public accountability, and external criticism. In India, for example, debates concerning the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) and the Collegium system prompted sustained advocacy by civil society organizations and human rights groups in favour of greater transparency. Yet the ultimate constitutional resolution emerged through judicial and constitutional processes rather than through external political pressure. The Indian experience illustrates that while civil society participation enriches constitutional discourse, final constitutional authority remains vested in institutions established under the Constitution.

A comparable institutional approach has been observed in the United Kingdom. Parliamentary scrutiny of issues relating to public criticism of the judiciary has consistently emphasized the protection of judicial independence as a fundamental constitutional value. Parliamentary committees have acknowledged that public debate regarding judicial decisions is both legitimate and necessary within a democratic society; however, they have simultaneously underscored that such criticism must not compromise either the institutional independence of the judiciary or public confidence in the administration of justice.

Similarly, in Canada, proposals concerning judicial reform have been subjected to extensive parliamentary examination through public hearings involving representatives of civil society, legal professional organizations, universities, and constitutional scholars. This consultative approach reflects the understanding that constitutional reform should be informed by broad-based public participation while remaining firmly anchored within established democratic institutions.

South Africa provides another instructive example. Complaints concerning members of the judiciary have generally been addressed through constitutionally prescribed procedures that ensure both procedural fairness and impartial adjudication. Rather than permitting political institutions or external actors to determine judicial accountability directly, South Africa has developed institutional mechanisms designed to preserve both judicial independence and public confidence in judicial integrity.

Likewise, in Australia, contemporary debates regarding judicial independence have generally been approached as questions of institutional reform rather than partisan political controversy. Discussions have focused on strengthening constitutional safeguards, improving institutional accountability, and enhancing public confidence without undermining the constitutional separation of powers.

These comparative experiences reveal a common constitutional principle. Parliamentary committees in democratic systems do not ordinarily seek to suppress criticism or punish non-governmental organizations for expressing concern. Instead, they function as institutional forums for fact-finding, public consultation, policy evaluation, and legislative oversight. From this comparative perspective, the decision of Nepal’s Parliamentary Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights to deliberate upon the present controversy falls squarely within its constitutional mandate and represents an appropriate exercise of parliamentary oversight.

International constitutional practice therefore conveys a consistent message. Democratic societies simultaneously protect judicial independence and freedom of expression. Neither value is absolute. The exercise of freedom of expression carries corresponding responsibilities, particularly where allegations concern constitutional institutions whose legitimacy depends upon public confidence. Serious allegations should therefore be supported by credible evidence; investigations should be conducted independently and impartially; and conclusions should emerge through legally established procedures rather than through political advocacy or public pressure alone.

Against this background, Nepal’s response to the recent joint statement issued by the three international organizations should be institutional rather than emotional. Where allegations of interference with judicial independence are advanced, the State should formally request the factual basis and evidentiary support upon which those allegations rest. If the allegations appear sufficiently serious, an independent and impartial investigation should be initiated. Upon completion of such an investigation, the competent authorities should publicly and transparently communicate their findings. If the allegations are not substantiated, the organizations concerned should be requested to correct the factual record or provide appropriate clarification. Conversely, if the allegations are confirmed, all responsible individuals—irrespective of their office or status—should be held accountable in accordance with the Constitution and the law. Such an approach simultaneously safeguards judicial independence, upholds Nepal’s commitment to international human rights norms, and reinforces respect for national sovereignty under the Constitution.

Part III: Constitutional Balance, Institutional Accountability, and the Way Forward

The institutional response of the Parliamentary Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights assumes particular constitutional significance in this context. Across mature constitutional democracies, parliamentary committees do not ordinarily function as punitive bodies against civil society organizations or international non-governmental organizations. Rather, they serve as institutional mechanisms for gathering evidence, conducting public hearings, reviewing public policy, and recommending legislative or institutional reforms where necessary. Their constitutional responsibility is not to interfere with ongoing judicial proceedings but to strengthen institutional accountability, reinforce judicial independence, and promote adherence to the rule of law. The present initiative undertaken by the Committee should therefore be viewed within this broader constitutional framework of parliamentary oversight and democratic accountability.

Ultimately, the strength of a constitutional democracy lies not in institutional confrontation but in maintaining an appropriate constitutional equilibrium among the organs of the State. Safeguarding the Judiciary from political pressure remains a fundamental responsibility of the State. Equally, international human rights organizations bear a corresponding responsibility to preserve their own institutional credibility by ensuring that their public assessments are grounded in verified facts, objective evidence, and sound legal analysis. Nepal’s sovereignty, judicial independence, and commitment to international human rights norms are not mutually exclusive constitutional values. Properly understood, they are complementary principles capable of reinforcing one another through adherence to constitutional procedures, due process, and institutional restraint. This constitutional equilibrium is, indeed, one of the defining characteristics of a mature democratic order.

Within the Nepalese constitutional context, however, several structural realities deserve candid reflection. Concerns have repeatedly been expressed by distinguished members of Nepal’s legal community regarding the Judiciary’s institutional approach to federalism. It has been argued that sections of the Judiciary were resistant to the constitutional vision of a federal judicial structure and that the Constituent Assembly’s original intention to establish a separate Constitutional Court ultimately gave way to the present Constitutional Bench owing to judicial opposition. As a consequence, some commentators contend that the Judiciary has not always been able to play the robust and constructive role expected of it in facilitating the implementation of the Constitution and Nepal’s federal system. Whether one agrees entirely with these assessments or not, such concerns have become part of Nepal’s ongoing constitutional discourse and merit serious institutional consideration.

Similarly, questions have periodically been raised regarding the relationship between certain judicial institutions and non-governmental organizations. Such concerns, together with recommendations for judicial reform, have also been acknowledged in reports prepared by the Supreme Court itself. These observations provide an important contextual background against which the recent statement issued by international non-governmental organizations should be evaluated. The issue is therefore broader than the immediate interests of particular judges. It also concerns the constitutional implications of external commentary that may be perceived as questioning legislative authority and constitutional processes—such as the promulgation of ordinances—thereby touching upon matters closely connected with Nepal’s constitutional sovereignty. These broader constitutional implications deserve careful and objective examination.

A constitutional democracy requires all actors—State institutions, the Judiciary, Parliament, civil society organizations, and international organizations alike—to recognize and respect the limits of their respective constitutional mandates. Observance of institutional boundaries is neither a sign of institutional weakness nor of democratic restraint; rather, it is an indispensable condition for constitutional governance itself. Where those boundaries are alleged to have been transgressed, the appropriate response is not political confrontation or rhetorical escalation but independent investigation, objective assessment, and lawful adjudication. Accountability must operate equally for all, irrespective of institutional affiliation or political status.

The persistence of impunity has long represented one of Nepal’s most significant constitutional and governance challenges. Yet impunity cannot be understood selectively—as a principle applicable only to others while exempting one’s own institution or constituency. A constitutional order founded upon equality before the law demands that every individual and every institution remain equally subject to legal scrutiny and constitutional accountability. Only by consistently applying these principles can Nepal strengthen public confidence in its democratic institutions and reinforce the rule of law.

The present controversy therefore calls not for institutional confrontation but for constitutional statesmanship. A measured, transparent, and evidence-based inquiry offers the most appropriate means of resolving competing claims while preserving public confidence in both the Judiciary and the democratic constitutional order. In my considered view, the Parliamentary Committee on Law, Justice and Human Rights is well placed to facilitate such a process by ensuring that the matter is examined objectively, transparently, and in accordance with constitutional principles. Through institutional dialogue rather than political polarization, Parliament can contribute to reinforcing judicial independence, strengthening democratic accountability, and safeguarding Nepal’s constitutional sovereignty.

Conclusion

The recent intervention by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists presents an important opportunity for constitutional reflection rather than political confrontation. Democratic constitutionalism demands simultaneous respect for judicial independence, the legitimate role of international human rights advocacy, and the sovereign authority of constitutional institutions. None of these constitutional values should be pursued at the expense of the others.

A mature constitutional democracy is distinguished not by the absence of disagreement but by its capacity to resolve institutional disputes through constitutional procedures, impartial investigation, and respect for the rule of law. Nepal’s constitutional future will ultimately depend upon its ability to preserve this delicate equilibrium. By ensuring that allegations are investigated independently, evidence is evaluated objectively, constitutional institutions operate within their respective mandates, and all actors remain accountable under the law, Nepal can strengthen both its democratic legitimacy and its commitment to universal human rights while fully preserving its constitutional sovereignty.

Abstract

Nepal evolved in the area of Intergovernmental relations (IGR, following the 2015 federalism transition from a unitary system to a federalized governance model comprising federal, provincial, and local levels. This change aimed to eliminate longstanding inequalities and enhance local empowerment. However, challenges persist in coordinating IGR, including issues with power sharing, jurisdiction conflicts, and ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms, which hinder governance. The study focuses on analyzing IGR dynamics, examining institutional frameworks, resource distribution, and policy implementation. It also aims to outline legal provisions for IGR regulation, exploring the roles of the National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act. The research highlights inefficiencies due to poorly defined coordination processes and emphasizes the need for mutual accountability, effective communication, and fiscal federalization. Despite progressive goals of inclusivity, challenges such as fiscal imbalance and capacity limitations threaten good governance. Utilizing qualitative methods and secondary data, contributing valuable insights into the complexities of Nepal’s federalism and IGR challenges post-Constitution.

Keywords: Intergovernmental relations, Coordination, cooperation, federalism, Constitution.

1. Introduction

Talking about inter-governmental relations, we must refer to chapters 5 and 20 of the Nepal constitution. The state structure and division of power have been referred to in Chapter 5 of the Constitution. According to Article 56 of the constitution, the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal is of federal, provincial, and local three-tier the system of governance. Federal, provincial, and local are the three levels of government will exercise their state power as per the law and constitution of the Country. The constitution itself has defined the state power as executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Additionally, article 59 of the constitution regarding the exercise of financial authority particularly states that federal, provincial, and local tiers of government can exercise law-making authority, budget-making, policy-making, developmental work choice, and implementation within their jurisdiction. Yet again, chapter 20 of the constitution has been entirely allocated to coordination and interrelation among federal, provincial, and local tiers of government. Articles 231 to 237 are particularly dedicated to coordination and interrelation between federal, provincial, and local government provisions and arrangements. This is the crux of the Intergovernmental relations at the federal, provincial, and local levels in Nepal. (Constitution of Nepal, 2015). Nepal’s application of federalism, instituted in the Constitution of Nepal (2015), was a complete break from the past and aimed at decentralizing power and enhancing local autonomy. The federal system of the three tiers–federal, provincial, and local–is designed to deliver an inclusive and participatory system of governance that reverses historical marginalization and promotes balanced development.

This paper analyzes Nepal’s federal interrelation and coordination mechanisms and their effectiveness in governance implementation. The paper critically examines institutional arrangements, legal laws, and practical challenges in offering a functional intergovernmental system. Furthermore, the paper identifies loopholes in existing mechanisms and offers policy recommendations to improve Nepal’s federal coordination.

2. Objective of the study:

Intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Nepal, stemming from the 2015 federalism shift, focus on cooperation among federal, provincial, and local governments. While aimed at reducing inequalities and promoting inclusive governance, challenges such as jurisdiction conflicts and ineffective dispute mechanisms hinder effective governance. The study analyzes IGR dynamics, including coordination mechanisms and resource distribution, proposing reforms to strengthen federalism. It emphasizes the role of the National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission and addresses issues of fiscal decentralization, service delivery, and citizen involvement for improved governance.

3. Methodology of the Study

This study employs a qualitative design to explore intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Nepal, specifically informal interactions among federal, provincial, and local governments. Data were collected through secondary means complemented by a scan of policy reports, constitutional provisions, and legislative structures. Thematic analysis was used to ascertain patterns and challenges of IGR, informed by a theoretical framework drawn from decentralization and federalism literature.

 4. Theoretical Framework

Intergovernmental relations in federal regimes are informed by varied theoretical paradigms explaining the power-sharing, coordination, and governance relationship. The examination of Nepal’s federal, provincial, and local interrelations can be accounted for by cooperative federalism, competitive federalism, fiscal federalism, and institutionalism. These theories provide explanations on how Nepal’s federalism operates, referring to both structural design and implementation problems. 

4.1. Cooperative Federalism:

Cooperative federalism is concerned with coordination among different tiers of government for effective governance. In this case, all government tiers work with one another rather than in silos. This is echoed by the Nepal Constitution (2015), which insists on coordination between federal, provincial, and local governments (Part 20, Article 231). The constitution envisions a system where the tasks of governance are shared yet interdependent and require cooperation to formulate policies and provide services (Adhikari, 2019). However, Nepal’s cooperative federalism is undermined by jurisdictional authority ambiguities, institutionally weak mechanisms, and political rivalries that hinder effective cooperation (Sharma, 2020).

5. Legal mandate: Interrelation and Coordination

5.1.      Legislative Coordination:

The Constitution of Nepal (2015) provides the base for coordinating between governments by way of various legal provisions setting roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms of interaction among federal, provincial, and local governments. However, the implementation of these provisions of the law has been hampered by overlapping jurisdictions, vague directions on how it should operate, and political intervention. The Constitution of Nepal itself recognizes that coordination and cooperation between governments at various levels are required.

The Legislative coordination, article 231 of the constitution, has managed the Legislative interrelation between the Federal and provincial levels. As follows: (1) The Federal Law may be made to cover the whole, or, as the case may be, to a portion of, the territory of Nepal. (2) A State law may be made to cover the whole, or as the need may be, to a portion of the territory of the State. (3) Where two or more States jointly request enactment of laws on any matter in Schedule 6 by the Government of Nepal, the Federal Parliament can enact necessary laws.

Those laws shall only apply to the concerned States. Principles of Federalism: This is the requirement of the legislative role of the three tiers of government. It is a division of powers as well as a legislative relationship at the same time. Article 232 also touches on the principle of federalism. It is The Interrelation of the Federation, Provinces, and Local Levels that the interrelation of the three tiers of government shall be based on cooperation, coexistence, and coordination.

5.2.      Executive Coordination:

Article 233 concerns executive relations amongst federal and state governments, stating that one State shall assist the implementation of provisions of law or judicial and administrative orders or decisions of another State. A State may exchange information and consult on matters of mutual interest and concern with another State, coordinate with each other with respect to their legislations and activities, and render mutual assistance. Inter-state Coordination is a major issue of administrative management.

There is a provision of the Inter-State Council in the Constitution to resolve political disputes. There is Article 234, which is only with inter-provincial relations with the federal government for that purpose; a council is under the chair of the Prime Minister, with the chief ministers of the provinces. Coordination between Federal, Provincial, and Local levels: Article 235 is for Coordination between the Federation, State, and Local Levels. To that end, the Federal Parliament shall pass relevant laws to ensure coordination between the Federation, the State, and the Local levels. For the achievement of this goal, the federal parliament has already passed the law named the Federal, Provincial, and Local Level (Coordination and Interrelation) Act 2077. The law created the Intergovernmental Coordination Council (IGCC), chaired by the Prime Minister, for resolving intergovernmental disputes among federal, provincial, and local governments., Sectoral Coordination Committees, which are required to coordinate policies and programs of various government levels, and the Provincial Coordination Committee (PCC), chaired by the Chief Minister, for enabling coordination among provincial and local governments.

These are different committees as well: the National Coordination Council, led by the Prime Minister, with all provincial and local representatives. Other than that, different subject committees have been developed as standby committees to organize different thematic problems. There is also a special committee that deals with the law if any problem needs to be resolved specially.

5.3.      Locals and Local-Province coordination:

Similarly, the responsibility of maintaining the coordination between State and Village Bodies or Municipalities and settling the political differences, if any arising, under the respective Village Body, Municipality, and District Coordination Committee, has been delegated by the provincial assembly. In clause (2), the procedure and process in respect of the settlement of disputes have been stated by the constitution as necessary under the provincial law. The Local Government Operation Act (2017) also lays down local-level governance structures, vesting legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the local governments. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangement Act (2017). This Act provides for the financial relations between different levels of government, such that revenue-sharing agreements, equalization grants, and fiscal transfers are guaranteed.

6.         Implementation Challenges of Coordination

Despite the constitutional and legislative frameworks of interrelation and coordination among federal, provincial, and local governments, there are several challenges that interfere with their implementation. The challenges stem from political, administrative, financial, and capacity limitations that undermine cooperative governance. Human resource management at government levels is governed by the Civil Service Act and the Provincial Public Service Commission Act.

However, Nepalese bureaucracy remains centralized, limiting institutionalization of federalism. Extended conflicts between federal and provincial governments regarding the deployment of staff and decision-making authority bear testimony to enhanced coordination in administrative control.

7. Political Issues

Political instability and competition for control are some of the greatest difficulties in the application of intergovernmental coordination. Political parties endeavor to consolidate authority rather than nurture cooperative federalism. Party realignments as well as ideological differences result in conflict among the different levels of government, which erodes the spirit of decentralization envisioned. Moreover, provincial governments, who are still in their infancy stage, experience political legitimacy as well as power, which renders them more difficult to coordinate with local governments.

8. Administrative Federalism in Nepal: Issues and Challenges

Adoption of the Constitution of Nepal in 2015 enshrined federalism as the country’s system of government with a vision of three levels of government—federal, provincial, and local—operating in cooperation and exercising autonomy. Administrative federalism, involving the structuring, allocation, and operation of bureaucracy and delivery of services mechanisms at these levels, is at the core of operationalizing federalism. The constitutional basis for administrative federalism is evident from various articles. Article 56 declares Nepal to be a federal democratic republican state with three levels of government. Schedules 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Constitution list exclusive and concurrent powers for the levels of government, and thereby necessitate a sound administrative machinery for operationalization. Articles 285 and 302 also give the impetus for the system of civil service and intergovernmental administrative structures, visualizing a federal civil service, provincial and local service structures. Nepal, however, has encountered significant obstacles in bringing administrative federalism to reality.

One of the major issues is the vagueness and procrastination in the enactment of federal civil service law. Though Article 285 prescribes a federal law for regulating civil service, the Federal Civil Service Act has not been enacted in its entirety, and the provincial and local governments have remained reliant on the central bureaucracy. The situation has generated tensions regarding staff deployment, appointments, and job security, and the civil servants tend to hesitate serving the provincial or local departments. Again, the lack of a coherent system of intergovernmental personnel management has prevented provinces from yielding the benefits of constitutional assurance of autonomy. For instance, whereas Article 232 provides for cooperation, coexistence, and coordination among the three levels of government, the absence of administrative clarity has generated overlapping authority and resistance from the bureaucracy.

Another immediate challenge is the allocation of resources and administrative capability. Though exclusive powers have been reserved by the Constitution for provinces and local governments in Schedules 6 and 8, policy planning and service delivery hinge on having proper human resources and institutional capability. The provinces do not routinely have trained personnel, technical specialists, and institutional outlets for policy transmission they must greatly depend on centrally based functionaries. The local governments, having been empowered by the Constitution, have similarly been plagued by deficits in capability, and skepticism has emerged concerning whether the federalism has actually decentralized power or transferred centralism to new arenas. The incongruence of constitutional framework and the reality of the administration has also thwarted the principle of subsidiarity on which the federalism rests.

Coordination mechanisms have been yet another area of challenge. The Inter-Provincial Council, as called for by Article 234, and other intergovernmental platforms were supposed to solve conflicts and harmonize policy. The mechanisms have, however, been poorly used, and bureaucratic centralism has remained paramount. Overlapping of bureaucracies in fields of concurrent jurisdiction like education, healthcare, and natural resources has created turf wars across various government levels. For example, federal departments have persisted in maintaining control over policy fields constitutionally devolved from provinces and cities, hurting their autonomy and generating tension in practices of the bureaucracy.

Also, politicization of bureaucracy is a significant challenge. The central and provincial bureaucrats have frequently been hired or shifted based on politics of affiliation and not on merit, diluting accountability and professionalism. The lack of an open career prospect for bureaucrats serving in provinces and local governments has created insecurity and reluctance and again dilutes service delivery. Again, the administrative culture from Nepal’s prolonged unitary regime has not evolved to meet the challenge of a plural, decentralized system. Rather than adopting cooperative federalism, subnational governments have instead been perceived by many bureaucrats as subservient entities and not as equals, defying the constitutional spirit of partnership.

Harmonizing practice and law remains just as problematic. Though the Constitution contemplates a federal, provincial, and local service framework, numerous enabling statutes have been held up or have been framed so as to reinforce central supremacy. The absence of legal certainty regarding provincial and local staff’s recruitment, promotion, and disciplinary powers has created perennial controversies. Judicial clarification, not infrequently useful, has not given decisive rulings on these matters of administrative friction and thereby kept large tracts of the constitutional potential of federalism from being fulfilled.

Overall, Nepal’s administrative federalism is at a crossroads. The 2015 Constitution provides good legal basis for a devolved and cooperative federal system, but practical traction has been restricted by weak legal frameworks, resistance by bureaucracy, ambiguity in the role of institutions, and weak coordination mechanisms. If its federal experiment is to become more robust, Nepal must prioritize the drafting of full-bodied laws on the civil service, the building of subnational unit capacities, de-politicization of the bureaucracy, and institutionalized mechanisms of intergovernmental coordination. Until these challenges are addressed, administrative federalism might become a contested field harmful to the federal vision of the Constitution.

At the end, there are no definite administrative mechanisms and institutional setup undermining coordination among the three levels of government. Overlapping jurisdiction in most instances results in conflicts, inefficiency, and duplicative activities. Bureaucratic inertia, lack of adequate human resources, and technical skills at the provincial and local government levels aggravate the problem. The slow administrative reorganization to adapt to the federal system makes it even more difficult.

9. Financial and Resource Restraints

The fiscal federalism structure in Nepal remains immature, as fiscal imbalances among different levels of government pose a serious threat. While the central government retains considerable control over expenditures, the provinces and local governments have restricted funding and the ability to generate revenues. The gradual release of fiscal transfers, coupled with restricted financial independence, has eroded service delivery at the grassroots level. Second, a poor process of financial accountability results in inefficiencies and chances of misallocation.

10. Constitutional and Legal Uncertainties

Despite constitutional assurances, uncertainties in sectoral jurisdiction between the federal, provincial, and local governments have given rise to jurisdictional conflicts. Uncertainty in legislation defining the mandate and jurisdiction of different levels of government has resulted in conflicts, particularly in education, health, and infrastructure development. This has resulted in slowing down implementation even further by court interventions. At the same time there are some Institutional and Technical Capability Constraints. Federalism requires capable institutions and qualified personnel to coordinate and implement efficiently. However, the majority of local governments in Nepal lack the necessary technical capacity and qualified human resources to carry out their responsibilities efficiently. The poor capacity of provincial and local governments to formulate policies, prepare development works, and use resources hurts the efficiency of the federal system.

11.       Policy Recommendations for Effective Coordination

11.1.    Institutionalizing a Strong Coordination Mechanism:

Establishing and operationalizing a particular Intergovernmental Coordination Council with federal, provincial, and local government representatives can facilitate regular communication and dispute settlement. The council should be provided with legal and political powers to oversee intergovernmental relations and policy coherence.

11.2.    Strengthening Legal and Policy Framework.

Legislation, explicit laws, and regulations defining the roles and mandates of the different tiers of government need to be enacted. Recasting the existing law to eliminate ambiguities, particularly where service delivery functions are concerned, such as education, healthcare, and disaster management, can reduce friction and enhance effectiveness.          

11.3.    Consolidating Fiscal Decentralization

Nepal can adopt a more balanced fiscal federalism model by providing time-bound financial transfers, allowing local governments to collect their revenues, and enhancing financial accountability mechanisms. Establishing a separate Fiscal Commission to manage resource allocation and resolve financial disputes can improve coordination.

11.4.    Human Resource Capacity Building and Training

Investing in local and provincial government officials’ capacity development and training is essential for good governance. The federal government must ensure knowledge-sharing platforms, conduct frequent training programs, and deploy competent personnel to aid lower levels of government. Having a centralized digital governance structure to pool data from federal, provincial, and local governments can allow for the coordination and enforcement of policies. A shared database with up-to-date information on fiscal transfers, development schemes, and public service delivery can reduce inefficiencies and improve decision-making.

11.5.    Building Political Will and Cooperative Governance.

Political will from all stakeholders is needed to commit to cooperative federalism. Political parties need to give top priority to decentralization and follow a non-partisan governance approach at all levels. Facilitating consensus-building practices and minimizing political interference in local administration can enhance coordination.

11.6.    Learn from the Best International Practices.

Nepal can learn from developed federal systems such as India, Germany, and Canada, where institutionalized mechanisms of coordination have strengthened intergovernmental relations. Adopting elements like an inter-state council, revenue-sharing models, and a federal advisory commission can strengthen Nepal’s model of federalism.

12.       Conclusion

Proper intergovernmental coordination and cooperation are required for the successful implementation of federalism in Nepal. Though Nepal’s constitutional design has provided the necessary foundation, persistent bottlenecks in political alignment, administrative effectiveness, fiscal decentralization, and legal clarity limit smooth inter-governmental coordination between federal, provincial, and local governments. Addressing these bottlenecks requires a combination of legal reforms, institutional capacity building, fiscal autonomy, and capacity building. Learning from international experiences and cooperative governance can assist Nepal in shaping its federal governance system and in ensuring effective service delivery to the people.

13.       References

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Sharma, J. R. (2019). Federalism in Nepal: Challenges and opportunities. In N. Paudel & B. R. Upreti (Eds.), Governance and policy reform in Nepal: Balancing local and national interests (pp. 87–104). Niti Foundation.

Sharma, P., & Karki, S. (2021). Fiscal decentralization challenges of Nepal. Nepal Economic Journal.

Shrestha, S. (2021). Intergovernmental relations in Nepal’s federal structure. South Asian Journal of Federal Studies.

Steytler, N. (2005). The place of intergovernmental relations in the new South African constitutional order. Law, Democracy & Development, 9(1), 1–25.

Thapa, R., & Sharma, K. (2022). Federalism in the world. Kathmandu: Nepal Academic Press.

Watts, R. L. (2008). Comparing federal systems (3rd ed.). McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Mahatma Gandhi had said, “Power is of two kinds. One is obtained through fear of punishment and the other through acts of love. Power based on love is a thousand times more effective and permanent.”

Elections are a celebration of democracy. But if that celebration cannot be fearless, fair, independent, and credible, democracy itself comes under question. In this context, the election code of conduct appears as a mandatory but complex ritual. In the backdrop of the upcoming elections in Nepal, the code of conduct is again at the center of debate—is it a voluntary moral document? Or a legal mechanism that can punish in practice? And the most serious question—why does the Election Commission, the body that enforces it, seem hesitant to use its authority? And the parties themselves make them, do not pay attention while making them, but after going to the field, they do not agree to follow them, accept them, and convince them. An attempt has been made in this article to discuss this controversial issue.

Code of Conduct: A Document of Consensus or a Binding Law?

When it comes to legitimacy and the power of punishment, Nepal’s election code of conduct is not a law made by a parliament. Nor is it part of the constitution made by the Constituent Assembly. It is a “consensus-based document” issued by the Election Commission in consultation with political parties, candidates, and stakeholders. This is why its legal status is always a matter of dispute.

On the one hand, parties participate in the process of making a code of conduct, agreeing in writing, but as the election approaches, a serious crisis arises in adopting the same document. The argument that “we have only made a political agreement, not a legal obligation” is heard from the mouths of the parties themselves. This limits the code of conduct to a moral precept.

Code of Conduct Without Punishment: An Exercise of Will or Politics of Illusion?

There is an established truth in democracy – the power to punish is not inherent in any document other than the law made by the law-making body, Parliament. Therefore, the code of conduct should not be punishable, but the code of conduct cannot be renewed in elections, and cannot be followed without the fear of punishment.

This contradiction is the main problem with the code of conduct. If the code of conduct is made completely punishable, there is a fear of curbing freedom of expression and political competition. But without any credible possibility of punishment, the code of conduct remains in danger of becoming a mere paper horse.

Looking at Nepal’s practice, it seems that the Election Commission is often limited to weak measures such as asking for clarification, warning if the answer is not satisfactory, asking for clarification again, and requesting “not to repeat it.” When the Commission hesitates to take decisive action even in serious violations, the message is clear – there is no need to pay a heavy price for breaking the code of conduct.

Has the Election Commission failed in the exercise of its powers?

The Constitution of Nepal has envisaged the Election Commission as an independent, powerful and constitutional body. The responsibility of ensuring election conduct, equal opportunities, and fair competition lies with the Commission. It is responsible for monitoring political parties. It is also free to take action against political parties. The Commission is also the judge who resolves internal disputes within the party. There is a legal provision that the decision made by the court is not final and can be appealed, but the decision made by the Commission is final. The law has also given the Commission the authority to punish violations of the law, from canceling candidatures to not being able to participate in the upcoming elections. But in practice, the Commission itself is not free from accusations of failing to exercise its authority.

Some trends seen in previous elections are memorable. Complaints about misuse of state resources by leaders of the ruling party come to the Commission. The open involvement of government officials in the election is confirmed. But in cases of violation of the code of conduct, the Commission is limited to silence of its own interest and choice. In the case of some, it even uses the stick, in the case of others, it turns a blind eye.

All these questions and actions raise the same question: is the Election Commission really an impartial referee or a spectator who pretends not to see powerful players?

What is more serious is that such weaknesses create a situation that can make a difference in the election results. If the misuse of resources, access and power is not controlled, free competition is not possible. If the code of conduct is violated and the state power is misused, or if votes are bought by spreading personal wealth, or if the booth is occupied by creating fear or terror, the candidate becomes addicted to winning. However, it makes a difference in elections. If the guards pretend not to see the exam and the examinees are allowed to steal the cheat, the results can be such that one passes or fails, and the other fails. What is more interesting is that only one passes in the election and the other fails.

International practice: How does the code of conduct work?

Looking at international experience, it is said that the code of conduct is not always like a law, but its effectiveness depends on institutional firmness. The neighboring country of India, where Bihar is also located. If there is a claim in the election, there is a saying called the Bihari style. In that country, India, the election code of conduct is not a law made by the Parliament. But the Election Commission’s strict and impartial implementation has earned it both fear and respect. There are examples of Chief Ministers and Prime Ministers being publicly banned because of the election code of conduct. This determination has made the code of conduct, even though it has no legal status,It has given practical power. Due to the adoption of the tradition established by TN Sessions by the Election Commission of India, the world’s largest democracy, electoral integrity is gradually improving and gaining credibility. Bihari style is entering Nepal, and it seems that Bihar is becoming peaceful and clean.

Britain, which is considered the oldest democracy in the world, where the code of conduct is mainly based on moral values ​​and norms. But since the political culture is strong, violation is considered like political suicide. Violators of the code of conduct are forced to face the opposite consequences, and the pressure of public opinion and media becomes the punishment there. This practice has been established.

South Africa, a country that, like Nepal, promulgated a constitution through a peace agreement after a long struggle and embraced democracy, can be another interesting example. Here, there is a system for reaching the election court in cases of violation of the code of conduct. The commission not only has the clear authority to make recommendations, but also to take action.

The above examples show that the impartiality of the Commission, its courage, continuity and impartiality, as well as its equal treatment towards all parties, are more important than the legal status in the implementation of the code of conduct.

Ironically, the situation in Nepal is different. “Why should we follow the code of conduct if there is no action even when the constitution and laws are violated?” has become firmly established. This argument, which is raised repeatedly in Nepal, is very serious. The lack of effective action, even when the laws made by the Parliament and the constitution made by the Constituent Assembly are violated, has created distrust in the rule of law. In such a background, the expectation that a code of conduct that has no legal status will be followed seems weak in itself.

But accepting this argument is not the development of democratic traditions and culture, but rather the acceptance of its decline. The solution to the weakening of the code of conduct is not to ignore it, but rather to use it effectively, fairly, and justly. The credibility of the Commission, which takes action without any discrimination in violations of the code of conduct, must be strengthened.

In conclusion, it can be said that the code of conduct is a mirror to assess its own weaknesses. The election code of conduct itself is not a problem. It is also synonymous with our political culture, institutional courage, democratic honesty, faith, and trust in democracy. It is also an insult to public opinion. It is also a fake attempt to show that public opinion is on your side by violating the code of conduct. Therefore, it can be said that the crisis seen in Nepal is not a question of the code of conduct, but a question of the strong will to implement it, trust in public opinion and political ethics.

If the Election Commission continues to hesitate to exercise its constitutional authority, if the parties consider the document they themselves agreed to as a burden, and if the violation of the code of conduct continues to affect the election results, then the entire democracy will have to pay the price, not just the commission or the parties. Ultimately, the question is, do we want a single election or a fair election and a result that reflects public opinion? In the end, it can be said that the code of conduct is a tool to find answers to these questions.

How to save to Nepal from failure

Dr. Khimlal Devkota

Member of the Constituent Assembly and Senior Advocate

Introduction:

Although the state that almost failed during the Genji Movement has escaped that stage, Nepal is still at a critical juncture. The credibility of the state’s sensitive institutions, the people’s trust and confidence in the ability of the leadership in all areas of politics, judiciary, administration, and diplomacy, the ability of the security agencies, impartiality, honesty, and stability, and the diplomatic balance of the country have all been questioned simultaneously. The famous book Why Nations Fail, written by Acme Glue and Robinson based on 16 years of research, has exposed the main reasons why nations fail. Among them are unstable leadership, oppressive and weak institutions, political instability, and unequal opportunity structures. The current scenario of Nepal is similar to the signs of a failed nation depicted in the book. However, it is said that whether a nation fails or not is not a crisis, but a result of the decisions made by the leadership. Today, Nepal is at this moment. This article attempts to discuss this.

Message of the book Why Nations Fail:

The book places political and economic institutions at the center of the question of why nations succeed or fail. According to the book, countries with exploitative institutions fail, that is, countries that maintain institutions that tend to take away power, resources, and opportunities from the people. On the contrary, successful countries are based on public interest, where access to power, resources, and opportunities is equally available to everyone.

If we look at the current challenges of Nepal in relation to the concept of the book, we can see four scenarios:

First, the centralization of power. The country has moved towards federalism, but the power of the state is concentrated in a few leaders, political families, or groups or factions. Parties operate in weak internal democracy, leadership change is blocked, and public access to the decision-making process is almost nil. No one is interested in the federalization of political parties. The result is political instability, distrust in leadership, and party interests above the national interest.

Second, the unequal distribution of opportunities. Contracts, appointments, business opportunities, access to bank loans, etc. are all monopolized as a means of earning money. Business and political alliances bring both wealth and opportunities into the hands of a limited number of people. The result is extreme corruption, economic inequality, and the emigration of youth.

Third, there is misuse of the law. The law is limited to the principle of equality for all. The belief that party control and influence should be maintained in the security agencies, judiciary, and administration is dominant. The result is corruption, impunity, distrust of the state, and anarchy.

Fourth, there is a lack of long-term policies. The result of frequent changes in government, unstable coalitions, and policies and plans based on the personal interests of the leadership is that destruction takes priority over development, and the possibility of structural reforms is zero. Which inevitably leads to anarchy.

In order to get rid of the situation highlighted in the book Why Nation Fail, any country in this situation, including Nepal, must do reform in political parties, fair application of law and order, equality in economic opportunities, and accountable, transparent governance, and youth-friendly leadership. Even when signs of a failed nation are visible, the fact that the power to overcome it also depends on the citizen’s awareness and the young generation conveys confidence and hope.

Having discussed the causes and consequences of a failed nation and the measures to avoid it, let us now discuss the situation in Nepal, keeping the same context in mind.

Recent political developments have taken away the trust of the state apparatus. The situation of KP Oli’s ‘rescue’ by helicopter only after he resigned as Prime Minister, the situation of major leaders being under mobile siege and being under the control of security agencies, and the situation of Singha Durbar, Parliament Building, Supreme Court, and the President’s Residence being the targets of attacks, has exposed how insecure, disorganized, and unstable the organs of the state are. In such a moment of crisis, foreign diplomatic bodies remained safe, but they remained silent. Which makes it clear how much Nepal has weakened its diplomatic balance and foreign status.

All these incidents and the subsequent decisions to form the government, including the selection of ministers to dissolve the parliament, are still in the hands of the same characters. Who used the Genji generation to spread anger through Discord, spreading the fear of a constitutional vacuum through the message of ‘to throw away the constitution or to keep it’. Under such circumstances, the insecurity, terror and despair that has increased among the people due to the ‘ruler’ of the country being caught in the clutches of anarchy cannot be said to be unnatural.

The silence of the security forces deployed to protect the state’s heritage is no less serious. Although human losses were avoided, complaints about the state’s heritage not being protected will remain forever. During the Genji movement, the entire security forces were seen to be inactive in both assessing the situation and mobilizing. There was no attempt to save the government and private structures from the arson that destroyed them using highly flammable chemicals. A thorough investigation has not even been initiated yet. This helplessness even when sensitive state structures are destroyed, and the state’s failure to even issue any warning in terms of action, are all signs of exploitative state structures, in the language of the authors of the book Why Nation Fail. The organs of such a state are not in the people, but in the hands of the power.It is a confirmed situation that the Shali faction is only responsible for the situation.

Meanwhile, political parties are busy with power sharing or building coalitions based on chairs, not on the basis of ideology or agenda. Cooperation based on ideas does not last. The process of breaking up and forming coalitions based on chairs and principles keeps on happening every five to ten months. Such political instability is said to be one of the biggest predictors of state failure.

On the other hand, the perception has spread among the people that corruption has crossed the limit, there is no trust in any organ of the state, the judiciary, administration, politics have all become unreliable. This is a very dangerous psychological situation for the nation. The Genji Movement has made it clear that when citizens start feeling separated from the state, the governance structure starts collapsing from within.

Amid such serious signs, the country is heading for elections. The power that was seized yesterday (NCA and UML) is opposing the restoration of the parliament and the elections, and the power that claimed to overthrow the government is not only trying to hold the 2084 elections in 2082, but it seems that both of them have expressed their intention to disrupt the elections. It is important to be aware of this. Elections are also necessary to restore the constitution, system, and the entire country to order. But it is equally important to understand that elections alone cannot save the nation from failure. For this, it is necessary to create a safe landing environment with the credibility of state institutions, people-responsive leadership, a political culture based on ideas, and progressive change.

Five ways to prevent Nepal from becoming a failed state

1. Institutional reconstruction and restoration of trust

What Nepal needs most now is the reform of political parties. In addition, there is both a restructuring and revival of state organs. From parliament, courts, administration, to security agencies, everyone should be restored and restructured in a framework of complete transparency, efficiency, and accountability. It is clear that law and order will never be respected until the security forces, which are subject to political influence, are freed from it.

2. Criteria of ethics and competence in leadership

Leadership should not be measured on the basis of a person’s charisma or popularity, but on the basis of ethics, decision-making ability, crisis management skills and public credibility. A leadership that has only the ability to incite a crowd indiscriminately can push the future of the state towards darkness, but cannot chart a journey from darkness to light. Democracy is not popularity, but another name for accountability.

3. Investing the energy of the Genji movement in institutional directions

The anger and energy of the young generation need to be diverted not towards ‘digital rebellion’ or ‘anarchic movements’ but towards policy reforms, participation in governance, fact-based politics, fundamental democracy, rule of law and transparency. The power to reform the state lies in this generation, but the right direction and structure are needed.

4. Strengthening diplomatic balance

The silence of foreign power centers during Nepal’s crisis is not just a political gesture. It is also an indicator of Nepal’s weakness. The nation must re-examine its foreign policy and make significant improvements in its equal distance, national interest-centered strategy, and crisis management capabilities. Only then will international power and relations be restored.

5. Solution through legitimacy, stability, protection of the constitution, and amendment

Pushing the nation towards anarchy by saying, “Burn or throw away” the constitution formed by the Constituent Assembly, or by creating various dilemmas, is the creation of a crisis, not a solution. The constitution is not destroyed, it needs reform. It is not the constitution that has failed, it is not, is not, and has not happened. It is necessary to understand that it is the political culture that has made it fail and find ways to reform it.

Finally:

At this time, there is no need to despair. There is a need for positive optimism. Therefore, it should be said that Nepal is not on the verge of failure, but rather is standing in the midst of reform. Today’s situation is definitely dire. But history shows that before any nation fails, time and circumstances provide a decisive opportunity that is acceptable to all, and that point of improvement is also found. Nepal is at that juncture now. The problems are huge, but solutions are possible. Solutions are possible if the political leadership can move the nation beyond personal ambition or digital crowd management and prioritize long-term stability, public trust, and institutional reconstruction. A nation, its people, or its leadership are not known by failure, but by its ability to improve. How Nepal moves forward depends on the maturity of its leadership, the right direction of citizen awareness, and institutional restructuring.

Dr. Khimlal Devkota

Constituent Assembly Member and Senior Advocate

Abstract

The Gen-Z movement that broke out all over Nepal in September 2025 is a watershed moment in Nepali politics. Highly powered by youth mobilization, internet mobilization, and an unbreakable combination of grievances of corruption, exclusion, and the sudden shutdown of favorite social media sites, the revolt ousted the governing government, precipitated an interim government, and burning and looting of the central secretariat of government, the Supreme Court, including the parliament building, despite the Gen Z movement’s mission. This article examines the probable performance of the forthcoming Parliament of Nepal following these incidents. The article constructs an analytical framework in which parliamentarians are located in four fields: institutional continuity, representativeness and legitimacy, effective law-making capacity, and effective oversight of the government functions with accountability, and deliberation of the people’s voices. The piece contends that although the Gen-Z movement generates both immediate demand for change and single-party political opportunity for renewal, the next Parliament’s potential will be hampered by (a) institutional disruption and physical destruction of parliament infrastructure, (b) legitimacy gaps among mainstream party elites, (c) frayed mechanisms of effective youth engagement, and (d) lingering powers of extra-parliamentary forces (security services, networks of informal elite). It ends with specific suggestions in line with similar uprising international experiences to enhance parliamentary performance during the transition: expedited post-conflict institutional construction, electoral reform to ensure youth engagement, increased legislative monitoring and post-legislative scrutiny, and a transparent process of accountability for suspected human rights abuses during the movements.

Keywords: Gen-Z Movement, parliamentary effectiveness, Democracy, Constitution and Parliamenterians.

1. Introduction

The political journey of Nepal, journey since the 1990s has been marked by cycles of hottest political contest and institution building: from the struggle for democratic republican, to ten years’ Maoist insurgency, to constitution-making to 2015. Gen-Z rebellion is the latest, and perhaps one of the most spectacular, examples in that journey on last September 2025. Spurred by state actions like social-media platform shutdowns and fueled by long-standing complaints of corruption and elite capture, the movement quickly evolved from youth-led online-organized protest to national direct action that included mass protests, arson raids on government offices (including the parliament building), and the fall of the prime minister. The state then appointed an interim government to guide the nation to new elections. These incidents generate short and long-term issues about the institutional capability of Nepal’s Parliament to perform its constitutional duties effectively in a post-Gen-Z political situation.

This paper analyzes the potential effectiveness of the next Parliament in the future by: (1) theorizing about parliamentary effectiveness; (2) outlining the particular disruptions and political realignments caused by the Gen-Z movement; (3) analyzing structural and procedural risks and opportunities for the parliament; and (4) proposing institutional and policy solutions to ensure and strengthen Parliament’s capacity to legislate, represent, and hold the executive accountable.

1. Conceptualizing Parliamentary Effectiveness: Theoretical Framework

Parliamentary effectiveness is a complex, multi-dimensional construct. Drawing on comparative legislative studies and the literature on governance, this paper conceptualizes parliamentary effectiveness as a four-dimensional construct:

2.1. Institutional Continuity & Capacity: the capacity of the parliament to sit, do business, form committees, and have a minimum of administrative support. without maintaining institutional continuity and capacity, no institution can prevail, as well as parliament.

2.2. Representativeness & Legitimacy: whether Parliament’s composition and operation express citizens’ political will, particularly that of group interests (here, youth/Gen-Z), and whether the latter enjoys public confidence.

2.3. Law-making & Policy Responsiveness: political and technical ability to bring forward, debate, amend, and enact legislation in response to major public interest issues (anti-corruption, freedom of press, social protection, people’s prosperity).

2.4. Accountability & Oversight: parliamentary control, monitoring, and oversight of the executive power, investigatory powers, committees, and post-legislative scrutiny procedures with deliberations of the people’s spirits.

This approach enables us to measure both immediate operational issues generated by the unrest (e.g., ruined infrastructure, dissolved HoR) and deeper normative/political issues with mandate, representation, and checks and balances. It also gives the highest priority to those indicators most closely aligned with democratic resilience: fairness and speed of electoral reset, inclusiveness of deliberation, quality of legislative product, and efficacy of oversight. (Carnage, 2025)

• The Gen-Z Movement: Facts, Political Fallout, and Immediate Institutional Shock

Contemporary journalism produces a series of undeniable facts about the Gen-Z mobilization: wide-scale youth protests erupted in early September 2025, quickly swept the nation, and became violent across the country. Government buildings; central administrative complex (Singha Durbar), parliament, supreme court, presidential residence, and others; were burned and reduced to ashes at the height of unrest; official tallies of injury and fatalities stood in the hundreds. The incumbent prime minister resigned, and a caretaker government headed by a non-partisan leader was instituted until new elections could be held. Worldwide coverage is concentrated on the movement’s mobilization via the internet channels of Discord and Instagram, and the mobilization by means of pop-culture symbols as symbols of mobilization. Such facts accentuate a systemic break: the legitimacy of the traditional elite was publicly challenged, and the state monopoly over the means of coercion and safeguarding of public infrastructure was proven to be weak.

Parliamentary operation had symbolic as well as tangible immediate repercussions. Parliament buildings suffered from fires; legislative proceedings were canceled or held elsewhere; significant administration and record-keeping tasks were halted. Aside from material destruction, the political legitimacy of the prior Representatives was considerably dented among certain strata of society that were in support of or allied with the Gen-Z protests. Trust in parliamentary processes, already precarious with episodes of polarization, was subjected to a severe examination of endurance.

 4.    Institutional Harm’s Impact on the Four Dimensions of Effectiveness

4.1. Institutional Continuity & Capacity

Physical loss of facilities affects the parliament’s capacity in clear-cut ways: the absence of records, destroyed committee rooms, lost IT infrastructure, and disrupted administrative services all slow down law-making. Where critical facilities are affected, Parliament has to fall back on temporary premises or remote/virtual sittings. Both of which create adversity to substantive committee work and deliberation quality. Administrative staff displacement and security issues further decrease capacity for research, drafting, and continuity in legislative support services. Reconstruction of infrastructure and digital systems will thus be an early practical priority towards recovering baseline effectiveness. A conducive environment has to be created for the expected result from parliament, so that they come out of the trauma and fear is a must.

4.2. Representativeness & Legitimacy

The movement’s key political message, that current political elites have fallen on corruption, inclusion, and accountability, politically challenges the parliamentary class’s moral authority. Even in the event of fresh elections, legitimacy is not automatically regained: election results can be representative of continuity if incumbent party machines continue to overbear candidate selection, or fragmentary if youth factions, independent lists, and fresh movements are given a voice. Net impact on effectiveness will hinge on whether the fresh Parliament reweights representation (via fresh parties, youth quotas, or electoral reform) or re-restores the pre-crisis balance. Without tangible action to incorporate Gen-Z voices, parliamentary legitimacy suffers an extended erosion of credibility, which weakens public responsiveness to legislative output.

4.3. Law-making & Policy Responsiveness

Gen-Z uprising demands are material (reversal of social-media bans, prosecution of tainted players, compensation to the victims) and systemic (initiate reforms for openness, youth recruitment). Parliament’s law-making ability will be put to the test by its ability to provide credible, timely, and effective reforms. But political salience suggests the reforms are controversial: vested interests that gained from secrecy will fight big change. The parliament’s capacity to produce good policy will thus depend upon: (a) committee make-up (reformist MPs in charge of key groups with forward-looking agendas), (b) technical assistance form the secretariat (research capacity, drafting competence), and (c) effective monitoring from outside the parliament. (media scrutiny, civil society involvement).

4.4. Accountability & Oversight

An effective Parliament must be able to examine the unrest itself, security force reaction, reported abuses, and chain of command behind the excess use of force or police breakdown, free from co-optation. The movement’s calls for justice and transparency put the parliament in the forefront of transitional justice questions, ownership, trust, and implementation of the upcoming report of the Karki probe commission. And if parliamentary supervision breaks down, or if committees get packed to stop involved stakeholders from being pulled out, public faith will be further shaken. But earnest and autonomous investigations by parliamentary bodies can enhance legitimacy and provide a way towards reconciliation. The evidence is in protecting oversight bodies from partisan takeover and delivering procedural fairness.

• Political Forces Building the Next Parliament

Fundamentals of the democracy is a political parties. Several political forces will decide whether the next Parliament will function:

5.1. Electoral Rules and Timing: The party system structure of elections (e.g., open lists, thresholds, timing) will determine how representative the new parliament will be. Proportional reforms and reduced thresholds to new parties or youth lists may amplify Gen-Z voice; however, precipitous elections within established party structures might perpetuate elite dominance again.

5.2. Transitional Security and Executive Actors: The transitional regime’s style, securitized crackdowns or conciliatory reforms, will define the overall tone. Military or security intervention in a political transition can undermine parliamentary autonomy if commanders hold de facto veto power.

5.3. Civil Society & Media: A vibrant civil society and independent media can act as external channels of accountability, working in unison with parliamentary committees and providing policy recommendations.

5.4. International Actors and Normative Pressure: Donors and multilateral actors can make aid conditional upon democratic guarantees, enhancing parliamentary reform incentives. These forces are interrelated: for example, international pressure for genuine elections can prevent the elite from manipulating the electoral code; a strong civil society can assist parliamentary committees in an inquiry; however, an active security sector can thwart both. (Mulmi, 2025)

6.         Obstacles to Effectiveness, Structural and Political

As the movement creates possibilities, among the long-standing hurdles, some challenges to hold back parliamentary performance. Elite Resilience and Co-optation is crucial. Political parties are institutionally well-established and possess patronage networks. Parties will evolve but co-opt Gen-Z icons without substantive reform, thus legislation will have performative instead of structural impacts.

Weak Legislative Capacity is another problem. The parliamentary secretariat and research support in Nepal have to develop fast enough to fulfill the need for high-level statutory changes (digital rights regimes, anti-corruption infrastructure). Gaps in capacity can enable poorly drafted legislation that will not pass tests of implementation.

Security-Legitimacy Tradeoffs will be disastrous. In the transition, impunity or over delegation to security agencies can limit Parliament from monitoring abuses or passing reforms to manage security excess.

Polarization and Fragmentation are unwanted consequences. A fractured party system consisting of several minor groupings can inhibit the formation of coalitions, causing legislative gridlock as well as short-term governments.

Public Expectations vs. Institutional Tempo always happens. The public mobilized by the movement will anticipate rapid accountability and visible change. Parliament’s deliberative process is slower, creating a gap that can fuel further discontent unless expectations are met (ABC, 2025).

7.         Windows of Opportunity: Why Parliament Can Be Effective

Genuine Gen Z has to be promoted and criminal elements should be punished is a fundamental of the time and situations. The focus has to isolate the ulterior motives and promote forward-looking causes. In addition to the challenges, post-Gen-Z also brings special opportunities:

7.1. Political Shock as Catalytic Momentum: Extended splitting apart of society can lead to institutional change when political visionaries seize the agenda. The interactive tension between mass mobilization and an incoming executive dedicated to reform can facilitate legislative breakthroughs.

7.2. Youth Mobilization as Political Resource: If parties and independent candidates include youth activists and leaders in candidate lists, Parliament can be opened to new ideas and reform legitimacy steps.

7.3. International Normative Pressure and Global Visibility: International visibility of the crisis raises reputational risks for backsliding and can stimulate donor-funded legislative capacity building.

7.4. Instruments of transparency technology: Websites (utilized by Gen-Z) may be utilized for crowdsourced surveillance, live feeds on legislative action lessening informational asymmetries between Parliament and the masses.

7.5. Reparations and transitional justice momentum: Politically popular calls for accountability provide the Parliament with a clear mandate to craft reparations, judicial commissions, and institutional protection measures that, if implemented in earnest, can rebuild trust (The Guardian, 2025).

8.         International Experiences

8.1. Tunisia:

As when mass movements topple or heavily destabilize political regimes, parliaments become where protest demands are typically translated into permanent reform. The Arab Spring gave space in Tunisia for a new constitution. But the long road from reformist constitution to de-captured, working institutions was arduous; oversight loopholes and compromised separation of powers left many early gains contingent on continued legislative follow-through to become actual. The Tunisian experience, therefore, emphasizes that popular mobilization-created constitutional space must be followed with long-term parliamentary consolidation (legal institutions, independent judiciary, and administrative capacity) to prevent reversal. (Carnegie, 2025). Tunisia has no national history to draw on in terms of how an empowered parliament should operate. Moreover, in Tunisia’s fragmented political party landscape, members of parliament from a myriad range of political movements will have to find a way to work together to put institution-building ahead of their political differences. (Fride, 2012).

8.2. Chile:

Chile’s protests of 2019–2020 similarly demonstrate how mass mobilization can force constitutional and parliamentary reckoning at the systemic level, but also how procedure and legitimacy matter. Massive public enthusiasm led to a successful referendum to draft a new constitution, but the first draft was later rejected as a reminder that inclusiveness at every stage (formation of drafting body, discussion, and final ratification) and respect for technical design are crucial if parliament-led reform processes are to be translated into popular energy into accepted, workable structures. Chile demonstrates that parliaments can be good sites for mediated reform only if processes are representative, transparent, and tied to citizen deliberation.

8.3. Iceland:

Iceland’s post-2008 trial offers the reverse lesson with respect to participatory legitimacy and institutional momentum. Following the financial crisis, Iceland experienced a remarkably participatory constitutional exercise crowdsourcing initial provisions and boosting civic voice that revealed the power of public engagement in its purest form to build parliamentary legitimacy and produce innovative reform concepts. But the ultimate inability to enact the new constitution in full also underlines a structural fact: participatory feedback can reframe the agenda, but without a steadfast parliamentary and party will to institutionalize those changes, momentum can dissolve. In short, participatory drafting can maximize legitimacy but is dependent on parliament to translate it into functioning institutions.

8.4. Ukraine:

The street protests across the country that led to this outcome were spearheaded by young, enthusiastic Ukrainians. Unlike the historic movements in 2004 and 2013, protesters demanded strong, independent government institutions, rather than facing the challenges of changing the country’s strategic course or replacing the president. This new wave of civic activism underscores an evolving democratic spirit among Ukraine’s youth determined to ensure the stability of the rule of law and institutional integrity (Nova, 2025). Ukraine achieved notable anti-corruption advances in parliament and outside parliament, but subsequent political backsliding and controversial legislative measures show how easily such gains may be undone without ongoing monitoring, civil-society scrutiny, and international attention; corrective rollbacks (or reversals) can happen quickly, illustrating the dynamic triadic dynamic among protest, parliament, and public accountability.

All these examples show the underlying motifs: (1) popular forces create opportunities for substantial parliamentary reform but are no guarantee against institutionalization; (2) inclusionary mechanisms (extended participation, open rules, independent oversight) maximize the likelihood that parliamentary outputs will be legitimized and implemented; and (3) technical capacity legislative drafting support, committee independence, and post-legislative review is required to bridge mandates into effective law. For cases like Nepal’s post-movement transition, these international lessons suggest prioritizing procedural legitimacy, strengthening parliamentary oversight institutions (e.g., anti-corruption and investigative committees), and balancing channels of participation for young people and civil society with real capacity building in the parliament if reform is to be lasting. (Carnegie, 2025)

9.         Policy and Institutional Recommendations

To enhance the performance of the subsequent Parliament, this paper proposes short- and medium-term measures in four directions aligned with the discussion above.

9.1. Rebuild Institutional Capacity and Continuity has to be in priority. Quick Restoration Plan for Infrastructure is a possible way. Reconstruct parliamentary premises, computer centers, and archival documents as top priority. Where possible, utilize hybrid (physical and virtual) models to reinstate committee work simultaneously. Emergency Legislative Secretariat Boost is also a burning issue. Increase the research and drafting personnel temporarily, perhaps supplemented by others national and international technical assistance as model of outsourcing, to work off the backlog of critical bills and oversight questions.

9.2. Improve Representativeness & Youth Representation in all sectors of society. Electoral Reforms for Youth Representation in political parties have to be in priority. Explore temporary or constitutional solutions youth quotas on party lists, incentives for taking independent youth candidates, or reserved seats in order to institutionalize Gen-Z representation. Candidate Training & Rapid Civic Education is a proper solution. Assist efforts at training young candidates for legislative seats (procedure, ethics, committee work).

9.3. Increase Law-making & Policy Responsiveness for the country. Priority has to be in the Legislative Agenda. Parliament must embrace an explicit, time-limited agenda prioritizing first: (i) overhaul of online censorship and safeguarding net rights; (ii) anti-corruption law and transparency; (iii) relief in emergency situations and reparations; and (iv) electoral and parliamentary procedure reform. Evidence-based drafting is the top priority. Develop a system of fast but evidence-based drafting (civil society and academic inputs in technical working groups).

9.4. Strengthen Oversight and Accountability is key to the society. Independent Parliamentary Inquiry is effective tool for oversight. Set up cross-party, independent inquiry committees to investigate the unrest, exercise powers of subpoena, and provide reports. Include non-partisan experts and civil society observers as an index of credibility. Effective implementation of the law is a key element for rule of law. Post-Legislative Scrutiny Unit has to be stablish. Enshrine post-legislative review to oversee law enforcement and rectification, thus enhancing the long-term quality of legislation.

9.5. Enshrine Civil-Parliamentary Dialogue for vibrant democracy. Enshrine Forums for Youth Dialogue for respect the spirit of the Gen z movement. Hold formal, recurring forums that convene representatives of Gen-Z, civil society, and MPs to debate priorities for policy and offer scrutiny. Transparency Portals are must waited tools for anti-corruption. Increase public access to legislative documents, voting patterns, and committee reports to rebuild confidence.

Ultimately, build a trust by participation, deliberation, communication, transparent and accountable manners are key elements for upcoming parliament. These are recommendations that need political will from the governments and political parties and concerted international backing respectful of Nepal’s sovereignty, national interests but in favor of democratic strength instead of regression.

10.       Possible Risks and Mitigation Measures

10.1. In politics, risks are always there but the viable solution is a way of mitigation. Different political movements that took place in Nepal before Nepal was declared a republic argue that all the earlier political movements failed to declaration of republic, before 2008, due to the crisis of political leadership and leaders’ dilemma to make decisions in the right time (Devkota, 2021). There is no risk-free way of implementing reforms. The principal risks and their mitigations are as follows;

10.2. Co-optation of youth symbols by the elite is crucial. Mitigation is a tool to achieve it.  Pass an open selection of candidates by primary election both in the party and the community, and make party lists and selection criteria public before elections.

10.3. Security pushback against oversight will be another risk. Provide legal cover to parliamentary committees and insert independent international observers for controversial issues.

10.4. Rapid elections favored by incumbents will be another risk factor. To mitigate, promote neutral electoral management and international observation; permit adequate time for new party consolidation and candidate screening.

10.5. Polarization and legislative gridlock are also other risk factors. To mitigate it, establish procedural rules for vital bills (committee stage time limits) with safeguards against deliberation quality deterioration. By pre-empting such risks, Parliament and its allies can craft well-targeted interventions that maintain democratic legitimacy as well as establish order (Kathmandu Post).

11.       Conclusion

In the context of Nepal, the adoption of federalism represents a significant shift in the country’s political landscape, aiming to address historical grievances, promote inclusivity, and foster socio-economic development (Devkota,2024). However huge problem in implementation so that frustrations fueled into youth. In this scenario, the Gen-Z movement has propelled Nepal into a high-risk political transition. The new parliament is at a turning point: it can ride the wave of reformist opinion to become an institution of democratic, sustainable transformation, or keep on with the old elite accommodation politics that do not deal with the sources of the grievances that drove the revolution. Parliamentary performance in this respect is not an inevitable byproduct of elections but is contingent on conscious efforts to recreate capacity, increase representation (particularly youth), enhance the quality of legislation, and create sound mechanisms of oversight capable of focusing on suspected abuses amidst the chaos.

Ultimately, the route to a good parliament goes through an equilibrium between public expectations and institutional reform. Quick, open, and effective policymaking in the context of the Gen-Z movement requires participatory electoral processes and independent scrutiny to regain trust and make the parliament the master builder of responsible governance. Instability perpetually and repeatedly performed is the alternative. The hour is delicate but holds an unprecedented chance: if Parliament seizes on propounding reform and inclusiveness, it can convert the pause into a sustainable revival of Nepal’s democratic institutions (Reuters, 2025). Finally, let’s hope, let’s make a plan for forward looking change as the spirits of the Gen Z movement and isolate criminal elements and their ulterior motives wherever they are.

12.       References

Devkota, K. (2021). Leadership Crisis in Nepali Politics: Specific Focus on National Parties in the Context of Declaration of the Republic. Social Inquiry: Journal of Social Science Research, 1(1). DOI: https://doi.org/10.3126/sijssr.v1i1.26915.

Devkota, K. (2024). Cooperative Federalism in the Nepali Constitution: A Comprehensive Analysis. Samsad Journal 1(1), 51-66. https://doi.org/10.3126/sj.v1i1.75903

Fride, (2012). Parliamentary reform after the Arab spring, Policy brief. 

Nova (2025) Ukraine’s Parliament Restores Independence to Anti-Corruption Agencies. Nova, Ukraine.

Mulmi, A.R. (2025). From street to discord: How toppled the Nepal’s Government. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/nepal-gen-z-topple-government?lang=en.

Hannah Ellis-Petersen & Gaurav Pokharel. (9 September 2025). The Nepalese government removes social media ban following protests [The Guardian/BBC reporting used in summaries]. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/09.

Reuters. (14 September 2025). Number of deaths from Nepal’s anti-corruption protests raised to 72.Reuters.,https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/death-toll-nepals-anti-corruption-protests-raised-72-2025-09-14/.

ABC News. (15 September 2025). Nepal’s Generation Z calls for change as nation embarks on new transition. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-09-15/nepal-generation-z-anti-corruption-protests-kathmandu/105773042.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (24 September 2025). From streets to Discord: How Nepal’s Gen Z overthrew a government Analysis.

Kathmandu Post Editorial. (12 October 2025). Divided, Gen Z falls. The Kathmandu Post. https://kathmandupost.com/editorial/2025/10/12/divided-gen-z-falls.